Optimal sensory decision-making requires the combination of uncertain sensory signals with prior expectations. The effect of prior probability is often described as a shift in the decision criterion. Can observers track sudden changes in probability? To answer this question, we used a change-point detection paradigm that is frequently used to examine behavior in changing environments. In a pair of orientation-categorization tasks, we investigated the effects of changing probabilities on decision-making. In both tasks, category probability was updated using a sample-and-hold procedure. We developed an ideal Bayesian change-point detection model in which the observer marginalizes over both the current run length (i.e., time since last change) and the current category probability. We compared this model to various alternative models that correspond to different strategies -from approximately Bayesian to simple heuristics -that the observers may have adopted to update their beliefs about probabilities. We find that probability is estimated following an exponential averaging model with a bias towards equal priors, consistent with a conservative bias. The mechanism underlying change of decision criterion is a combination of on-line estimation of prior probability and a stable, long-term equal-probability prior, thus operating at two very different timescales.
category A and was clockwise of the criterion line or if the ellipse belonged to category 66 B and was counter-clockwise of the criterion line. The overt-criterion task is an 67 explicit version of the covert-criterion task developed by Norton et al. [16] . The 68 overt-criterion task provides a richer dataset than the covert-criterion task in that it 69 affords a continuous measure and allows us to see trial by trial changes in the reported 70 decision criterion, at the expense of being a more cognitive task. In both tasks, the 71 categories were defined by normal distributions on orientation with different means 72 (µ B = µ A + ∆θ) and equal standard deviation (σ C ); the mean of category A was set 73 clockwise of the the mean of category B and a neutral criterion would be located 74 halfway between the category means ( Fig 1C) . The difficulty of the task was equated 75 across participants by setting ∆θ to a value that predicted a d ′ value of 1.5 based on 76 the data from the initial measurement session (see Methods). All data are reported 77 relative to the neutral criterion, z neutral = (µ A + µ B )/2.
78
Prior to testing, observers were trained on the categories. Only the covert-criterion 79 task was used for training (see Section 6 in S1 Appendix). During training, category 80 probability was equal (π = 0.5) and observers received feedback on every trial that 81 indicated both the correctness of the response (tone) and the generating category 82 (visual). As a measure of category learning, we compute the probability of being 83 correct in the training block and averaged across sessions. All observers learned the 84 categories to the expected level of accuracy (p(correct) = 0.74 ± 0.01; mean ± SEM 85 across observers), given that the expected fraction of correct responses for an ideal 86 observer with d ′ = 1.5 and equal priors over categories is 0.77. As an additional test of 87 category learning, immediately following training observers estimated the mean 88 orientation of each category by rotating an ellipse. Each category mean was estimated 89 once and no feedback was provided. There was a significant correlation between the 90 true and estimated means for each category (category A: r = 0.82, p < 0.0001; 91 category B: r = 0.97, p < 0.0001), suggesting that categories were learned. However, 92 on average mean estimates were repelled from the category boundary (average 93 category A error of 11.3°± 6.3°and average category B error of −8.0°± 2.6°; mean ± 94 SEM across observers) suggesting a systematic repulsive bias. 95 To determine how category probability affects decision-making, during testing 96 category A probability π t was determined using a sample-and-hold procedure ( Fig 1D; 97 category B probability was 1 − π t ). For t = 1, category A probability was randomly 98 chosen from a set of five probabilities S π = {0.2, 0.35, 0.5, 0.65, 0.8}. On most trials, no 99 change occurred (∆ t = 0), so that π t+1 = π t . Every 80-120 trials there was a change summarized in Fig 1E . A: Trial sequence in the covert-criterion task. After stimulus offset, observers reported the category by key press and received auditory feedback indicating the correctness of their response. In addition, the fixation cross was displayed in the color of the generating category. B: Trial sequence in the overt-criterion task. Prior to stimulus onset, observers rotated a line to indicate their criterion by sliding the mouse side-to-side. When the observer clicked the mouse, a stimulus was displayed under the criterion line and auditory feedback was provided. C: Example stimulus distributions for category A (green) and category B (red). Note that numbers on the x-axis are relative to the neutral criterion (i.e., 0 is the neutral criterion). D: Example of random stepwise changes in probability across a block of trials. Change points occurred every 80-120 trials and are depicted above by the black arrows. Category A probabilities π t were sampled from a discrete set, S π = {0.2, 0.35, 0.5, 0.65, 0.8}. E: Generative model for the task in which category probability π is updated following a sample-and-hold procedure, a category C is selected based on the category probability, a stimulus s is drawn from the category distribution and is corrupted by visual noise resulting in the noisy measurement x. Note that this diagram omits the dependency that leads to change points every 80-120 trials.
Bayesian models 109
To understand how decision-making behavior is affected by changes in category 110 probability, we compared observer performance to several Bayesian models. To 111 compute the behavior of a Bayesian observer, we developed a Bayesian change 112 point-detection algorithm, based on Adams and MacKay [27] , but which also accounts 113
for Markov dependencies in the transition distribution after a change. Specifically, the 114 Bayesian observer estimates the posterior distribution over the current run length 115 (time since the last change point), and the state (category probability) before the last 116 change point, given the data so far observed (category labels until trial t, 117 C t = (C 1 , . . . , C t )). We denote the current run length at the end of trial t by r t , the 118 current state by π t , and the state before the last change point by ξ t , where both 119 π t , ξ t ∈ S π . That is, if a changepoint occurs after trial t (i.e., r t = 0), then the new 120 category A probability will be π t and the previous run's category probability 121 ξ t = π t−1 . If no changepoint occurs, both π and ξ remain unchanged. We use the 122 notation C (r) t to indicate the set of observations (category labels) associated with the 123 run r t , which is C t−rt+1:t for r t > 0, and ∅ for r t = 0. The range of times with a colon, 124 e.g., C t ′ :t , indicates the sub-vector of C with elements from t ′ to t included.
125
Both of our tasks provide category feedback, so that at the end of trial t the 126 observer has been informed of C 1:t . In S1 Appendix we derive the iterative Bayesian 127 ideal-observer model. After each trial, the model calculates a posterior distribution 128 over possible run lengths and previous probability states, P (r t , ξ t |C 1:t ). The 129 generative model makes it easy to calculate the conditional probability of the current 130 state for a given run length and previous state, P (π t |r t , ξ t , C 1:t ). These two 131 distributions may be combined, marginalizing (summing) across the unknown run 132 length and previous states to yield the predictive probability distribution of the 133 current state, P (π t |C 1:t ). Given this distribution over states, in both tasks the 134 observer needs to determine the probability of each category. In particular,
In the overt task, the ideal observer sets the current criterion to the optimal value 136 z opt t based on the known category orientation distributions and the current estimate of 137 category probabilities. Further, in the ideal and all subsequent models of the overt 138 task, in addition to early sensory noise (σ v ) we assume the actual setting is perturbed 139 by adjustment noise (z t = z opt t + ε t , where ε t ∼ N (0, σ 2 a )).
140
In the covert task, the observer views a stimulus and makes a noisy measurement 141
x t of its true orientation s t with noise variance σ 2 v . The prior category probability is 142 combined with the noisy measurement to compute category A's posterior probability 143 P (C t+1 = A|x t+1 , C 1:t ). The observer responds "A" if that probability is greater than 144 0.5.
145
We consider the ideal-observer model (Bayes ideal ) and three (suboptimal) variants 146 thereof, which deviate from the ideal observer in terms of their beliefs about specific 147 features of the experiment (Bayes r , Bayes π , and Bayes β ). Two further variants of the 148 Bayesian model (Bayes bias and Bayes r,β ) are described in S1 Appendix. Crucially, all 149 these models are "Bayesian" in that they compute a posterior over run length and 150 probability state, but they differ with respect to the observer's assumptions about the 151 generative model.
152
Bayes ideal The ideal Bayesian observer uses knowledge of the generative model to 153 maximize expected gain. This model assumes knowledge of sensory noise, the category 154 distributions, the set of potential probability states, and the run length distribution.
155
Because observers were trained on the categories prior to completing each 156 categorization task, assuming knowledge of the category distributions seems developed additional Bayesian models (described below), in which observers could 162 have potentially incorrect beliefs about different aspects of the generative model.
163
Bayes r The Bayes r model allows for an observer to have an incorrect belief about 164 the run length distribution. For a given discrete r, the observer believes that the run 165 length distribution is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution, ∼ Unif 2 3 r , r . We 166 chose this particular interval rather than a more general one, because it is simple and 167 includes the true generative distribution. For the ideal observer, r = 120.
168
Bayes π The Bayes π model allows for an observer to have an incorrect belief about 169 the set of probability states. The veridical set of experimental states is five values of π 170 ranging from 0.2 to 0.8. The Bayes π model observer also assumes five possible values 171 of π evenly spaced, but ranging from π min to π max = 1 − π min , where π min is a free In addition to the Bayesian models described above, we tested the following heuristic Reinforcement-Learning (RL) model, the decision criterion is updated following an 189 error-driven learning rule with no assumptions about probability. We also tested three 190 additional heuristic models that are described in the Supplementary material (see 191 S1 Appendix).
192
Each of the following models, other than the RL model, computes an estimate of 193 category probability (π A,t ) on each trial and the estimated probability of the 194 alternative isπ B,t = 1 −π A,t . On each trial, the optimal criterion z opt is computed 195 based on these estimated probabilities in the identical manner as for the Bayesian 196 models. To make a categorization decision in the covert-criterion task, the criterion is 197 applied to the noisy observation of the stimulus. In the overt-criterion task, the 198 observer reports the criterion, which we again assume is corrupted by adjustment 199 noise.
200
Fixed While incorporating category probability into the decision process maximizes 201 expected gain, an alternative strategy is to ignore changes in probability and fix the 202 decision criterion throughout the block. In the fixed-criterion model, we assume equal 203 category probability and the criterion is set to the neutral criterion:
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This model is equivalent to a model in which the likelihood ratio, P (xt|Ct=A) P (xt|Ct=B) , is used 205 to make categorization decisions rather than the posterior odds ratio in the 206 covert-criterion task. This is a reasonable strategy for an observer who wants to make 207 an informed decision, but is unsure about the current probability state and its rate of 208 change.
209
Exp The exponential-averaging model computes smoothed estimates of category 210 probability by taking a weighted average of previously experienced category labels, 211 giving more weight to recently experienced labels:
where α Exp is the smoothing factor, 0 < α Exp < 1, and C t = 1 if category A is 213 observed on trial t and C t = 0 otherwise. The time constant of memory decay for this 214 model is τ = −1 log(1−αExp) . Mathematically this model is equivalent to a delta-rule [28] 215 model based on an "error" that is the difference between the current category and the 216 current probability estimate:π A,t+1 =π A,t + α Exp (C t −π A,t ). The criterion z is then 217 set to the optimal value based on this category-probability estimate.
218
Exp bias The Exp bias model is identical to the Exp model, while also incorporating a 219 common finding in the literature [2] known as conservatism (i.e., observers are biased 220 towards the neutral criterion). On each trial an estimate of probability is computed as 221 described in (Eq 3), and averaged with a prior probability of 0.5:
where w is the weight given to the probability estimateπ A,t and (1 − w) is the weight 223 given to π A = 0.5. The criterion z is also set to the optimal value based on this 224 category-probability estimate. 
where ν p is a model parameter that represents the strength of the observer's prior probability of a change is low, more weight is given to nodes greater than l 1 and the 243 probability estimate is more stable. For a three-node model probability is estimated as 244
For the purpose of the current experiment, we used a three-node model in which 245 the first node was fixed (l 1 = 1) and l 2 and l 3 were allowed to vary. In addition, the 246 prior strength parameter, ν p , which modulates the learning rate, was also free. By 247 allowing ν p to vary, this model is equivalent to the three-node model described by 248 Wilson and colleagues [29] in which all nodes were free and ν p = 2 was fixed. The 249 hazard rate was set to 0.01 and we assumed a change occurred at t = 1, so that all the 250 weight was given to l 1 . We also tested an alternative model with a fixed value of 251 ν p = 2, but it resulted in a worse fit.
252
RL While the models described above make assumptions about how probability is 253 estimated, it is also possible that observers simply update the decision criterion 254 without estimating the current probability state. Reinforcement-learning is a 255 model-free approach that assumes the observer does not use knowledge of the 256 environmental structure. Instead, the decision criterion, rather than an estimate of 257 category probability, is updated. The observer updates the internal criterion (z) on 258 each trial according to the following delta rule:
Thus, the criterion is updated when negative feedback is received by taking a small is shown in black (Fig 2A, top) . For reference, π A is shown as a function of trial 274 (Fig 2A, bottom) . From visual inspection, the observer reported A more often when 275 π A,t > 0.5 and B more often when π A,t < 0.5.
276
In the overt task, the orientation of the observer's criterion setting, relative to the is impossible for an observer to attain, we can see that the observer's criterion follows 282 the general trend. This suggests that observers update their criterion appropriately in 283 response to changes in probability. That is, the criterion is set counter-clockwise from 284 the neutral criterion when π A,t > 0.5, and clockwise of neutral when π A,t < 0.5. does not tell us how. To explore the mechanism underlying these changes, we 291 compared the observers' data to multiple models. For each task and model, the mean 292 model response for a representative subject is plotted in Fig 2B ( fixed-effects analysis), and also via a Bayesian Model Selection approach (BMS; [31] ) 311 in which subjects are treated as random variables. With BMS, we estimate for each 312 model its posterior frequency f in the population and its protected exceedance 313 probability φ, which is the probability that a given model is the most frequent model 314 in the population, above and beyond chance [32] .
315
Model comparison (Fig 3) favored the Exp bias model, which outperformed the 316 second best model Bayes r (covert task: ∆LML = 9.27 ± 2.86; overt task: 317 ∆LML = 8.96 ± 4.01; mean and SEM across observers) in the two tasks (covert task: 318 t(10) = 3.99, p = 0.003; overt task: t(10) = 2.37, p = 0.04). Similarly, Bayesian model 319 comparison performed at the group level also favored the Exp bias model (covert task: 320 f = 0.46 and φ = 0.96; overt task: f = 0.38 and φ = 0.84). These results suggests that 321 observers estimate probability by taking a weighted average of recently experienced 322 categories with a bias towards π = 0.5.
323 Fig 4A shows the number of observers that were best fit by each model for each 324 task. To compare LML scores across tasks, and for the purpose of this analysis only, 325 we standardized model scores for each observer and task. Standardized LML scores in 326 the overt task are plotted as a function of standardized LML scores in the covert task 327 in Fig 4B. We found a significant positive correlation, r = 0.62, p < 0.01, indicating 328 that models with higher LML scores in the covert task were also higher in the overt 329 task. This result suggests that strategy was fairly consistent across tasks. In addition, 330 there was more variance in model scores for worse-fitting models.
331
Model parameters 332 We examine here the parameter estimates of the best-fitting model, Exp bias , recalling . 338 We conducted paired-sample t-tests to compare the raw parameter estimates in the 339 covert and overt tasks. We found a significant difference in w (t(10) = −2.55, 340 p = 0.03), suggesting that observers were more conservative in the covert than the 341 overt task. No significant difference was found for α Exp (t(10) = −0.98, p = 0.35).
342
To investigate whether there was bias in the parameter-estimation procedure when 343 fitting the Exp bias model, we also conducted a parameter-recovery analysis. Most 344 parameters could be recovered correctly, except for adjustment variability (σ a ) in the 345 overt task, which we found to be overestimated on average (see Section 4 in 346 S1 Appendix for details). Note that this bias in estimating σ a in the overt task does 347 not affect our model comparison, which is based on LMLs and not on point estimates. 348 While we might expect performance to be similar across tasks and observers (i.e., a 349 correlation between the parameter fits in each task), no significant correlations were 350 found (α Exp : r = −0.14, p = 0.67; w: r = 0.16, p = 0.64). Parameter estimates for all Table 2 . Maximum a posteriori parameter estimates ±S.E. in the overt-criterion task. orientation-categorization task as prior probability changed. We tested a set of models 358 that varied in both computational and memory demands. Models were tested on data 359 from both a covert-and overt-criterion task. A comprehensive approach, consisting of 360 both qualitative and quantitative analysis, was performed to determine the best fitting 361 model. We found that observers updated their decision criterion following changes in 362 probability. Additionally, we observed systematic changes in the decision criterion 363 during periods of stability, which was clearly evident in the overt-criterion data. 
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Criterion updates in response to implicit changes in category probability 370 To determine the influence of prior probability on decision-making behavior, we 371 examined changes in the decision criterion. First, we found that no participant was 372 best fit by a fixed-criterion model. This finding suggests that observers update 373 decision criteria in response to implicit changes in probability. This result is consistent 374 with previous studies in which prior probability was explicit [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . Further, this 375 finding complements recent studies suggesting that individuals can learn and adapt to 376 statistical regularities in changing environments [14-17, 24, 25, 33, 34] Multiple-mechanism models have been used to describe behavior in 421 decision-making [29] and motor behavior [38] . A model that combines delta rules 422 predicts motor behavior better than either delta rule alone [38] . Using a combination 423 of delta rules [29] , we were able to capture the local fluctuations in criterion that the 424 full Bayesian model missed. However, we found that a constant weight on π = 0.5 fit 425 better than the multiple-node model described by Wilson and colleagues [29] .
426
Temporal differences between their task and ours might explain some of the differences 427 we observed, as changes occurred much more slowly in our experiment. Additionally, have had incorrect assumptions about the rate of change [21, 22] .
431
Explanations of conservatism 432
While we observed conservatism in both the covert-and overt-criterion tasks, we 433 found that, on average, observers were significantly more conservative in the covert 434 task. To understand why conservatism differs across tasks, we need to understand the 435 differences between the tasks. While the generative model was identical across tasks, 436 the observer's response differed. In the covert task, observers chose between two 437 alternatives. In the overt task, observers selected a decision criterion. This is an 438 important difference because it allows us to potentially rule out previous explanations 439 of conservatism, such as the use of subjective probability [4] , misestimation of the 440 relative frequency of events [39, 40] , and incorrect assumptions about the sensory 441 distributions [41, 42] ; these explanations predict similar levels of conservatism across 442 tasks. On the other hand, conservatism may be due to the use of suboptimal decision 443 rules. Probability matching is a strategy in which participants select alternatives 444 proportional to their probability, and has been used to explain suboptimal behavior in 445 forced-choice tasks in which observers choose between two or more 446 alternatives [6, [43] [44] [45] [46] . Thus, the higher levels of conservatism in the covert task may 447 have been due to the use of a suboptimal decision rule like probability matching, 448 which would effectively smooth the observer's response probability across trials.
449
Probability matching is not applicable to responses in the overt task. Thus, the use of 450 different decision rules may result in different levels of conservatism. These differences 451 may also arise from an increase in uncertainty in the covert task due to less explicit 452
feedback. An observer with greater uncertainty will rely more on the prior. Thus, 453 conservatism may be the result of having a prior over criteria that interacts with task 454
uncertainty. This can be tested by manipulating uncertainty over the generative model 455 and measuring changes in conservatism. It is also possible that conservatism is the 456 result of both the use of suboptimal decision rules and one or more of the previously 457 proposed explanations.
458
Incorrect assumptions about the generative model 459 While we tested a number of Bayesian models that explored an array of assumptions 460 about the generative model, clearly one could propose even more variants. In 461 particular, we only analyzed one such assumption at a time. A simple way to expand 462 the model space is via a factorial comparison [36, 47] , which we did not consider here 463 due to computational intractability and the combinatorial explosion of models. Most 464 notably, for all except the RL model we assumed knowledge of the category 465 distributions. However, Norton et al. [16] found that for the same 466 orientation-categorization task, category means were estimated dynamically, even after 467
prolonged training. Similarly, Gifford et al. [48] observed suboptimality in an 468 auditory-categorization task and found that the data were best explained by a model 469 with non-stationary categories and prior probability that was updated using the recent 470 history of category exemplars. This occurred despite holding categories and 471 probability constant within a block. In fact, similar effects of non-stationarity have 472 been observed in several other studies [49] [50] [51] . In addition to non-stationary category 473 means, observers may also have misestimated category variance [52] , especially since 474 learning category variance takes longer than learning category means [14] . Toolbox [54, 55] .
496
Stimuli were 4.0 x 1.0°ellipses presented at the center of the display on a mid-gray 497 background. In both the orientation-discrimination and covert-criterion tasks, trials 498 began with a central white fixation cross (1.2°). In the overt-criterion task, a yellow 499 line with random orientation was presented at the center of the display (5.0 x 0.5°). During the 'measurement' session, sensory uncertainty (σ v ) was estimated using a 521 two-interval, forced-choice, orientation-discrimination task in which two black ellipses 522 were presented sequentially on a mid-gray background. The observer reported the 523 interval containing the ellipse that was more clockwise by keypress. Once the response 524 was recorded, auditory feedback was provided and the next trial began. An example 525 trial sequence is shown in Fig S3A in S1 Appendix.
526
The orientation of the ellipse in the first interval was chosen randomly on every 527 trial from a uniform distribution ranging from -90 to 90°. The orientation of the 528 second ellipse was randomly oriented clockwise or counter-clockwise of the first. The 529 difference in orientation between the two ellipses was selected using an adaptive 530 staircase procedure. The minimum step-size was 1°and the maximum step-size was 531 32°. Each observer ran two blocks. In each block, four staircases (65 trials each) were 532 interleaved (two 1-up, 2-down and two 1-up, 3-down staircases) and randomly selected 533 on each trial. For analyses and results see S1 Appendix.
534
Category training
535
Each training trial was identical to a covert-criterion trial ( Fig 1A) . During training the estimate from the true mean. From visual inspection, it appears that training was 549 effective with the exception of one outlier, which we assume was a lapse.
550
Categorization tasks 551 Covert-criterion task In the covert-criterion task, observers categorized ellipses 552 based on their orientation. The start of each trial (N trials = 800) was signaled by the 553 appearance of a central white fixation cross (500 ms). A black oriented ellipse was 554 then displayed at the center of the screen (300 ms). Observers categorized the ellipse 555 as A or B by keypress. Observers received feedback as to whether they were correct on 556 every trial. Observers received a point for every correct response and aggregate points 557 were displayed at the top of the screen to motivate observers. In addition, the fixation 558 cross was displayed at the center of the screen in the color corresponding to the true 559 category (category A: green; category B: red). The next trial began immediately. An 560 example trial sequence is depicted in Fig 1A. 
561
Overt-criterion task In the overt-criterion task, observers completed an explicit 562 version of the categorization task described above that was developed by Norton et 563 al. [16] . At the beginning of each trial (N trials = 800), a line was displayed at the 564 center of the screen. The orientation of the line was randomly selected from a uniform 565 distribution ranging from -90 to 90°. The observers' task was to rotate the line to For fitting, all models had one free noise parameter. In the covert-criterion task, this 577 was sensory noise (σ v ). In the overt-criterion task, sensory noise was fixed and set to 578 the value obtained in the 'measurement' session, but we included a noise parameter for 579 the adjustment of the criterion line (σ a ). Fixing one noise parameter in the 580 overt-criterion task ameliorated potential issues of lack of parameter identifiability [56] , 581 and ensured that models had the same complexity across tasks. The Bayes ideal and 582 Fixed models had no additional parameters. Each suboptimal Bayesian model had one 583 additional parameter: Bayes r (r); Bayes π (π min ); Bayes β (β). The Exp and RL models 584 also only had one additional parameter (α). The Exp bias had two additional 
where data are category decisions in the covert-criterion task and criterion orientation 589 in the overt-criterion task, M is a specific model, and θ represents the model 590 parameters (generally, a vector). The first term of Eq 8 is the log likelihood, while the 591 second term is the prior over parameters (see below).
592
We evaluated Eq 8 on a cubic grid, with bounds chosen to contain almost all values (see Tables 1 and 2 ). We used the full posterior distributions to compute 602 PLOS 18/24 posterior predictive distributions, that is, model predictions for visualization (see 603 Model visualization), and to generate plausible parameter values for our 604 model-recovery analysis.
605
Priors over parameters We chose all priors to be uninformative. For noise 606 parameters, inspired by the Jeffreys prior for scale parameters, we used uniform priors 607 in log space over a reasonably large range ([0°, 3.4°]) [57] . For α exp , α RL , and w we 608 used a uniform prior from 0 to 1. For κ we used a uniform prior from 2 to 200 trials.
609
For π min we used a uniform prior from 0 to 0.5. For β, we used a uniform prior on the 610 square root of the parameter value, ranging from 0 to 10. Instead of fitting the 611 individual nodes in the Wilson et al. (2013) model, we fit the difference between 612 nodes, i.e., δ 1 = l 2 − l 1 and δ 2 = l 3 − l 2 . We used a uniform prior on the square root of 613 δ 1 ranging from 1.01 to 5 and on the square root of δ 2 ranging from 1.01 to 14. Finally, 614 for ν p we used a uniform prior in log space from 0 to 5.
615
Response probability 616 Covert-criterion task For each model, parameter combination, observer, and trial 617 in the covert-criterion task, we computed the probability of choosing category A on 618 each trial given a stimulus, s t , and all previously experienced categories, C 1:t−1 . In all 619 models, the observer's current decision depends on the noisy measurement, x t , so the 620 probability of responding A for a given stimulus s t is 621 p(Ĉ A |s t , C 1:t−1 , M, θ) = p(Ĉ A |x t , C 1:t−1 , M, θ)N (x t |s t , σ 2 v )dx t .
Because the current criterion setting in the RL model depends on the vector of all 622 previous stimulus measurements, x 1:t , the probability could not be computed fixed lapse rate, λ = 10 −4 , that is the probability of a completely random response.
628
The probability of choosing category A,Ĉ A , in the presence of lapses was then 629 p(Ĉ A |s t , C 1:t−1 , M, θ) = (1 − λ)p(Ĉ A |s t , C 1:t−1 , M, θ) + λ 2 .
Effectively, the lapse rate acts as a regularization term that avoids excessive penalties 630 to the likelihood of a model for outlier trials. 
where t is the trial index and N trials is the total number of trials.
635
Overt-criterion task For each model, parameter combination, observer, and trial 636 in the overt-criterion task, we computed the decision criterion on each trial. For all 637 models except the RL model, the criterion was computed as in S1 Appendix. For the 638 RL model, the criterion was computed as in Eq 7 for 5000 sample measurement 639 vectors. For all models in the overt-criterion task, the criterion was corrupted by 640 adjustment noise with variance σ 2 a , so thatẑ t ∼ N (z t , σ 2 a ), where z t was the observer's 641 PLOS 19/24 chosen criterion at trial t, andẑ t was the actual reported criterion after adjustment 642 noise. In addition, the observer had a chance of lapsing (e.g., a misclick), in which case 643 the response was uniformly distributed in the range. Therefore, the probability that 644 the observer reports the criterionẑ t was 645 p(ẑ t |C 1:t−1 , M, θ) = (1 − λ)p(ẑ t |C 1:t−1 , M, θ) + λ 180 ,
with λ = 5 × 10 −5 . As in the covert-criterion task, we computed the log likelihood
